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INTRODUCTION 
“The American story,” Bush said, was “a story of flawed and fallible people, 
united across the generations by grand and enduring ideals.” 
“We are not this story’s author, who fills time and eternity with His 
purpose,” the president continued. “Never tiring, never yielding, never 
finishing, we renew that purpose today, to make our country more just and 
generous, to affirm the dignity of our lives and every life.” 
President George W. Bush, Jan. 20, 20011 
Throughout the years, the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay has witnessed 
an abundance of intriguing linguistic words and phrases. For example, 
“Freedom Vanilla” replaced French Vanilla ice cream in the mess hall,2 and 
the area where journalists and others were often sequestered during their visits 
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to the base was re-named “Camp Justice.”3 The list goes on. However, the 
language that has had the most significant impact throughout the years has 
been the words and phrases used in the administration of justice regarding the 
detainees being held on terrorism charges. 
Wall St. Journal Supreme Court reporter Jess Bravin’s book, The Terror 
Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay, thoroughly chronicles how the use 
of military commissions came about for the first time since the Second World 
War, and pointedly demonstrates the abundance of problems they faced once 
established. In addition to telling the story of Marine Corps lieutenant colonel 
Stuart Couch, an earnest military prosecutor who later becomes exhaustively 
disenchanted with the commissions, the book chronicles the new linguistic 
frontiers in the American legal community. In particular, the disturbing 
treatment of detainees and the hasty establishment of the commissions 
significantly troubled the process, leading to numerous problems that the 
commissions still face today, more than a decade after their establishment. 
Noting in his first inaugural address that it was “a time of blessing,” 
President George W. Bush stated that he would “bring the values of our history 
to the care of our times,” and that he would confront the nation’s problems 
“instead of passing them on to future generations.”4 Though it may have been 
inaugural rhetoric, these phrases are a far cry from the language and policies 
employed under the administration. This is especially true in the context of the 
“war on terror.”5 As Bravin declares approximately a third of the way into his 
book: 
“The Bush administration . . . acted as though 9/11 had forever changed the 
constitutional order, creating a permanent state of emergency where 
legislative and judicial powers must yield to executive policy decisions. 
Even so, the administration insisted there was no risk to human rights, 
because its secret policies were consistent with legal obligations and 
American traditions.”6 
This book review analyzes how particular language used throughout the 
establishment and execution of the commissions differed from American legal 
traditions and proactively disrupted the job of commission officials, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys. In particular, it focuses on four linguistic 
changes that had considerable influence: (1) From Due Process to “Full and 
Fair”; (2) From Classified to “Protected”; (3) From Custodial Interrogation to 
“Enhanced Interrogation”; and (4) From Acts of Terrorism to “Material 
Support for Terrorism.” These phrases consistently usurped traditional 
American legal language found in the Constitution, Acts of Congress, ratified 
treaties (such as the Geneva Conventions), and led the commissions down a 
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perilous path of ambiguity. 
I.  FROM DUE PROCESS TO “FULL AND FAIR” 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”7 Bush’s November 13, 2001 
Military Order fell significantly short of this standard, noting that the 
commissions will “at a minimum provide . . . a full and fair trial, with the 
military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law.”8 Bravin’s text, 
which spans more than a decade, emphasizes that the meaning of “full and 
fair” was never fully realized. It was not defined in the 2001 Military Order, 
and much of the confusion between the members of the Prosecutor’s Office 
that Stuart Couch works for is attempting to determine what exactly the phrase 
means. 
Analyzing the evolution of Bush’s Military Order, Bravin notes that an 
almost complete “draft declared it ‘not practicable’ for military commissions to 
follow ‘the principles of law and the rules of evidence’ that defined American 
justice.”9 Additionally, the document “made no reference to basic elements of 
due process – proof beyond a reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, the 
right to remain silent. The only standard was that evidence hold ‘probative 
value to a reasonable person.’”10 After seeing the draft Order, a group of top 
Judge Advocate Generals reacted in “disbelief,” and one noted that the 
document was “insane.”11 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Vice President Cheney may have been most 
forthright in terms of how the “full and fair” commissions developed, noting 
that prisoners “will have a fair trial, but it will be under the procedures of a 
military tribunal, under rules of and regulations to be established in connection 
with that . . . . We think it guarantees that we’ll have the kind of treatment of 
these individuals that we believe they deserve.”12 Given the evolution of the 
commissions and the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, one assumes that the 
former Vice President accurately expressed the Administration’s perspective 
on the trials. 
After much confusion, wasted time, and squandered resources, Stuart 
Couch drafted a list of prosecution standards which could have guided 
standards for “full and fair” trials in order to protect due process concerns. 
These included not pursuing “Special Project” detainees that have been 
subjected to enhanced interrogation unless all documents regarding the 
interrogation were released, and providing defense counsel classified and 
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unclassified materials. The proposed standards were largely ignored.13 
One voice that administration and commission officials could not ignore 
was John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.14 
Stevens declared that the commissions in their current form violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Conventions. 
Stevens further noted that “Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and as 
indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a ‘regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.’”15 Subsequent to this ruling, however, Congress passed the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006,16 which stipulated that commissions’ 
procedures would proceed according to UCMJ regulations. Yet, the Act also 
stated that no defendants could “invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of 
rights.”17 Additionally, because of the problems associated with the “full and 
fair” procedures that were already being administered, the Act deemed 
inapplicable the speedy trial,18 compulsory self-incrimination,19 and 
investigation20 sections of the UCMJ. 
Ultimately, the “full and fair” standard deviated so far from traditional 
American justice that its meaning never fully materialized, and the phrase 
provided numerous problems for prosecutors in their early attempts to try the 
Guantanamo detainees. 
II.  FROM CLASSIFIED TO “PROTECTED” 
One of the major barriers in assessing whether there was “reason to 
believe” that an individual should be prosecuted was a new classification 
designed to withhold evidence. While governmental information has a well-
established system in terms of categorizing classified and unclassified 
materials, Commissions’ authorities added an additional status category to 
unclassified information that they wanted suppressed.21 Bravin writes that the 
commissions added the “protected” status but provided no definition for the 
term,22 therefore complicating matters for those individuals involved in and 
reporting on the commissions. 
Although Bush’s Military Order mentioned Clinton’s Executive Order 
regarding classified national security information, administration officials did 
not seem to abide by the “uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and 
declassifying national security information” that the document provided.23 
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During a Pentagon briefing, appointing authority of commissions, John 
Altenburg attempted to shed some light on the intricacies of the term, stating, 
“I try to draw a balance – Should I release this name? Should I allow this to be 
public? Should we put this up on the website? When I analyze and I see that 
there are national security interests or potential intelligence issues, I’m inclined 
to err on the side of being careful.”24 This explanation hardly explains the 
differences in thought processes, let alone the differences in official 
administrative standards regarding what constitutes “classified” versus 
“protected.” 
The new classification caused particular problems with journalists that 
were covering the commissions, including Bravin. Journalists viewed the video 
feed of the trials on a five-minute delay, so that nothing “protected” would slip 
out. However, for those privileged reporters that acquired seats inside the 
courtroom, officials noted that if any “protected” information was revealed, 
“soldiers would seize [the journalists’] notebooks, read them for proscribed 
information, and tear out the offending pages.” Photocopies of seized pages 
would later be returned with the “protected” information blackened out. 
The Order went even further in prohibiting “protected” evidence from 
being seen by defendants or their attorneys. In a stirring reminder of how this 
differed from traditional American legal values, Bravin quotes Presiding 
Officer of Commissions Col. Pete Brownback asking defendant al-Bahlul: “Do 
you realize that because – well, that in accordance with the president’s Military 
Order and Military Commission Order No. 1, there may be evidence against 
you which you would not be allowed to see because of its protected nature?”25 
These words would likely never be uttered inside an American courtroom. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld attempted to remedy this situation, noting that it is an 
indisputable part of customary international law26 that the accused must “be 
privy to the evidence against him.”27 As noted above, however, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 deemed the investigation section of UCMJ 
inapplicable. 
In all, the introduction of the “protected” classification further muddled 
the commission’s process, especially with regard to journalists and defendants. 
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III.  FROM CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION TO “ENHANCED INTERROGATION” 
Custodial interrogation procedures are some of the most litigated, 
adjudicated and sophisticated aspects of America’s criminal justice system, 
designed to protect defendant rights and allow interrogators to lawfully, 
although at times questionably, obtain information. Interrogation practices 
among U.S. police forces continue to have their problems, but the vast majority 
of these difficulties revolve around deception, not physical abuse or torture.28 
Two Supreme Court cases, one of them over a century old, virtually eliminated 
the practice of physical torture during custodial interrogation: the 1884 case of 
Hopt. v. Utah29 and the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi.30 Even where 
physical abuse was not a concern, the Supreme Court ruled in Chambers v. 
Florida that “persistent questioning and ‘other ingenious forms of entrapment’ 
could constitute compulsion.”31 Nevertheless, interrogation practices under the 
commissions radically diverged from traditional custodial practices. 
Bravin notes that early on the administration attempted to present a rosy 
picture of detainees’ treatment, stating that “[o]fficials insisted that treatment 
of prisoners was ‘humane’ and ‘consistent with’ Geneva conventions. In June 
2003, President Bush underscored those claims with a statement marking the 
United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture.”32 
Additionally, Bravin reports that “Jim Haynes, responding to a query from 
Senator Patrick Leahy, sent a letter stating that the United States conducted 
interrogations ‘consistent with’ the Convention Against Torture and its 
implementing legislation.”33 
However, John Yoo, now a professor of law at the University of 
California, Berkeley Law School, wrote a confidential Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion noting that federal law banning torture did not apply to suspected 
terrorists,34 and Rumsfeld himself signed off on “special interrogation 
plans.”35During these sessions, interrogators often used a set of Army 
“approaches” including: “incentive”, “Fear-Down,” “Fear Up,” and “Pride and 
Ego Down.”36 Bravin also cites “[a]dditional ‘tactics to induce control, 
dependence, compliance, and cooperation’ [that] included ‘isolation/solitary 
confinement,’ ‘degradation,’ ‘sensory deprivation,’ ‘manipulation of diet,’ 
 
 28. Irina Khasin, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation 
Practices in the United States, 42(3) Vand. J. Transnat’l. L. 1029, 1043-1049 (2009). 
 29. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
 30. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 31. Khasin, supra note 27, at 1044. 
 32. Bravin, supra note 1, at 81. 
 33. Id. at 82. Yet over time these assertions would prove false. A recent report by a non-partisan 
commission noted that the United States “indisputabl[y]…engaged in the practice of torture” at Guantanamo 
Bay, Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas. Constitution Project, The Report of the Constitution Project’s Task 
Force on Detainee Treatment, pp.1-8 (2013), available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/Full-Report.pdf. 
 34. Bravin, supra note 1, at 92. This memorandum remains classified, but is referenced in other 
memorandums. 
 35. Id. at 105, 257. 
 36. Id. at 88-89. 
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‘disruption of sleep and biorhythms,’ and ‘sensory overload.”37 These tactics 
are far beyond practices that occur in traditional custodial interrogations, and 
as far as prisoners of war are concerned, such practices have been banned since 
the U.S. signed the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and formally ratified them in 
1955.38 
Some suspects wished that their captors turned them over to the United 
States, presumably based on the traditional American protections afforded to 
defendants and the United States’ record of abiding by the Geneva 
conventions. In fact, Bravin asserts that this was Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s 
wish.39 Yet after Slahi completed a disturbing stint in Jordan, he had no idea 
what was in store for him as the US was adapting to its novel “rough justice” 
standards. Bravin states that his “enhanced interrogation” techniques included 
the following: 
“Slahi was forced to stand, stripped naked, bent over; his anal cavity was 
searched. He was beaten – medical records later recorded ‘rib contusions’ as 
well as bruises and cuts to his lip and head – placed in isolation, subjected to 
temperature extremes, including a room called the ‘freezer.’ He would be 
accused of breaking rules, of hiding things in his cell, then insulted and 
disciplined again. The ‘interrogation team will make detainee feel 
psychologically uncomfortable, emotionally uncomfortable, assert 
superiority over detainee, escalate stress, play loud music, and continue to 
condition detainee to menial tasks,’ the plan said.”40 
The label of “enhanced interrogation” framed the issue in such a way that 
established principles of justice were shunned and gaining information, any 
information, was supported. Additionally, the phrase undermined the 
legitimacy of the military commissions and its ability to prosecute many of the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees. Its common use by administration officials further 
demonstrates how the traditional values of the American justice system, giving 
due respect for defendants’ rights and the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions, were routinely swept aside. 
IV.  FROM ACTS OF TERRORISM TO “MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM” 
The United States encountered numerous acts of terrorism before 
September 11, 2001, even at the hands of al-Qaeda.41 Indeed, crimes regarding 
terrorism and specific acts of terrorism were already present in American 
law.42 However, since Guantanamo largely housed “the butcher[s], the baker[s] 
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and the candlestick maker[s]”43 of 9/11 and those found on the battlefields of 
Afghanistan, established law provided little recourse for prosecuting such 
defendants. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 somewhat alleviated that 
problem, stipulating a novel terrorism-related crime: “providing material 
support for terrorism.”44 The inclusion of this offense in the Act was essential, 
because Hamdan v. Rumsfeld found that “conspiracy” was not included in any 
congressional Act and was not recognized under international law.45 The 2006 
Act remedied this situation for a spell and eventually Australian David Hicks, 
in addition to Hamdan, were convicted of this crime. 
When attempting to convict and sentence defendants, however, the phrase 
was not just used as a defined crime or offense that juries may consider, but as 
a prominent slogan for prosecutors. Bravin notes that during Hamdan’s 
sentencing hearing, prosecutor John Murphy repeatedly stated the phrase 
“material support for terrorism” in his closing argument. In fact, he used it over 
twelve times (that the text documents) and Bravin states that he emphasized 
the word “terrorism” over “material support.”46 At one point prosecutor 
Murphy stated, “His material support of terrorism has changed our world as we 
knew it. They changed it dramatically in our lifetime and perhaps changed it 
forever . . . . Think of the victims of his material support for terrorism and their 
families, living each day without loved ones, and their photographs that are 
forever changed.”47 Additionally, one of his final statements to the sentencing 
panel in Mr. Hamdan’s case was “[t]ake one second, just one second, and think 
about the victims of Hamdam’s material support for terrorism . . . . Please, do 
justice for all the victims of material support for terrorism in this case.”48 
Although Murphy asked for a life sentence, the panel gave Hamdan a 
sentence of five months and eight days, including time already served. The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals eventually vacated Hamdan’s conviction based 
on the fact that “material support for terrorism,” as defined in the 2006 Act, 
could not retroactively apply to Mr. Hamdan’s actions.49 The ruling potentially 
brought into question some of the other defendants that have been tried or 
convicted under the charge of “material support for terrorism,” such as the 
above-mentioned David Hicks, an Australian citizen who was caught among 
Taliban fighters in Afghanistan 2001, pled guilty in 2007, and was 
subsequently repatriated to Australia.50 
Though “providing material support for terrorism” still stands as a crime 
by which new offenders can be convicted, the novel phrase nevertheless 
provided many difficulties for the Guantanamo Bay commissions, and 
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especially for some of the early trials. 
CONCLUSION 
The Terror Courts, in addition to being an engaging and thoroughly 
researched text, is a valuable demonstration of what can happen when 
traditional notions of American justice are replaced with ill-conceived, ad hoc 
legal phraseology. It is also a reminder that the language of current and future 
administrations should be monitored to ensure that we do not stray from the 
traditional and constitutionally appropriate legal values we have developed as a 
nation. For example, in a recent letter by Eric Holder to Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Patrick Leahy on the killing of American citizens using drones,51 
Mr. Holder stated that it was “clear and logical that United States citizenship 
alone does not make individuals immune from being targeted.”52 Yet, what is 
“clear and logical” to Mr. Holder may not be so to other members of Congress 
and to other legal scholars. 
Rather than “bring[ing] the values of our history to the care of our times,” 
the Bush administration set their own course regarding the administration of 
justice and the linguistic phrases they concocted for the military commissions 
at Guantanamo Bay. Some of this phrasing has been altered or rendered 
obsolete because of court opinions and a change in administration. Yet, some 
of it remains. The introduction of these novel terms into the administration of 
justice made it significantly more difficult to try and convict detainees. The 
linguistic acrobatics further transformed the commissions into a charade, 
threatening the legitimacy not only of the commissions themselves but of the 
United States’ competency to deal with suspected terrorists and the larger “war 
on terror.” Ultimately, the pioneering language transformed traditional notions 
of American justice into “rough justice.” 
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